

When Life is Art and Philosophy: The Case of Richard Shusterman

Lukáš Arthur Švihura

This article is motivated by a reading of J.J. Abrams' proceedings *Shusterman's Somaesthetics: From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Of the diverse range of essays in the proceedings, I concentrate my attention primarily on those aspects of the texts that highlight Richard Shusterman's practical somaesthetics, and in which their authors focus on the more personal aspects of Shusterman's philosophical-artistic experimentation, as captured in *The Adventures of the Man in Gold: Paths Between Art and Life, A Philosophical Tale*. Through references to Foucault's notion of care of the self and the aesthetics of existence, the article demonstrates that the individual level of Shusterman's practical somaesthetics is not separable from the social-ethical level. This is matched by the conclusion of the text, which points out that Shusterman's practical somaesthetics overcomes the dichotomy of private and public in Richard Rorty's pragmatism. | *Keywords: Somaesthetics, Richard Shusterman, Pragmatism, Art of Life*

I am one of those philosophers for whom the role models are colleagues and predecessors for whom philosophy is not only an area of theoretical interest, but also an area of life practice. For philosophers such as Socrates, Diogenes, Epicurus, and Marcus Aurelius (to mention just a few of the ancients), philosophy was reflected in the way they conducted their personal lives, in their interactions with other people, and in the kind of actions that could have socio-political, ethical, and pedagogical implications. Among contemporary philosophers, the pragmatists are especially known for such a link between theory and practice. And among them, Richard Shusterman has a special position.

There can be no doubt that Shusterman does not merely capture his philosophy in texts, but actually embodies it. However, new horizons of thought are opened to his readers by a book whose content will resonate with them for a long time after they have finished it. This is the case with the

This article constitutes the output of the research project VEGA no. 1/0537/21 The Art of Life in the Context of Philosophical Practice.

proceedings edited by Jerold J. Abrams and which was published in 2022 by Brill under the title *Shusterman's Somaesthetics: From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. The title promises a rich probe into Shusterman's philosophy and its various developmental phases and transformations, and thus a probe into the transformations of Shusterman the philosopher and artist, who, as we will attempt to show, cannot be separated from his philosophy (and art).

Abrams divided the book into three parts, 'Part 1: Pragmatism and Somaesthetics'; 'Part 2: Performative Philosophy and the Man in Gold'; and 'Part 3: Shusterman in His Own Words'. In total, the volume contains fourteen chapters and Abrams' 'Introduction', in which he charts and introduces his readers to Shusterman's journey from analytic aesthetics to pragmatic aesthetics to somaesthetics. Here Abrams identifies sources of inspiration for Shusterman, most notably Rorty and Danto's interpretation of Andy Warhol's *Brillo Boxes*. From the still overly analytical aesthetics of Danto, according to Abrams, Shusterman begins to shift his attention to Dewey's aesthetics, which is imbued with the relationship between art and life, until finally Shusterman arrives at somaesthetics as the third stage of his thinking. This is fully manifested when "Shusterman traversed the boundary enclosing academic philosophy to become a performing artist" (Abrams, 2022a, p. 12).

The work Abrams refers to here was made in collaboration between Shusterman and photographer Yann Toma and is titled *The Adventures of the Man in Gold: Paths Between Art and Life, A Philosophical Tale*. The entire second part of Abrams' collection is devoted to analyses of this work. Before readers can learn more about the enigmatic figure of the Man in Gold, however, they have the opportunity to get acquainted with the different levels of somaesthetics in the first part of the book, entitled 'Pragmatism and Somaesthetics.' Although these parts of the book are thematically relatively closed units, it seems that Shusterman's pragmatism can be separated from his performance art only with difficulty, if at all. It is these intersections of philosophy, art, and life that we will attempt to reconstruct in what follows.

Since Shusterman's development from analytic aesthetics to pragmatist aesthetics to somaesthetics, somaesthetics has become "an open field of collaborative, interdisciplinary, and transcultural inquiry" (Shusterman, 2012, p. 8). This is ultimately evident in the diversity of somaesthetic approaches and themes that appear in Abrams' collection, as well as other approaches that can be found in different contexts. In the plurality and ramification of somaesthetics, then, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that, in addition to all that somaesthetics undoubtedly is and can be, it is first and foremost a complex philosophy. The authors of the texts in the Abrams collection are aware of this, for the references to philosophical theories that accompany their explorations are numerous throughout the texts. Perhaps the most uncompromising insistence on the philosophical character of somaesthetics, however, is made by Alexander Kremer in his essay 'From Pragmatism to Somaesthetics as Philosophy,' who systematically reconstructs the

philosophical inspirations of somaesthetics and finally lists five reasons why somaesthetics should be seen specifically as philosophy (Kremer, 2022, pp. 53–59). For me, the last reason is the most important, where Kremer argues:

Somaesthetics also renewed the ancient Greek understanding of philosophy. It is not only writing and lecturing, but firstly, and above all, somaesthetics is a way of life. Shusterman, in arguing for philosophy as an embodied ‘ethical art of living,’ also finds support in ancient Asian thought (Kremer, 2022, p. 58).¹

So when I say that somaesthetics is a complex philosophy, I am not at all denying the plurality of its other forms. I am writing about somaesthetics as a philosophy in a broader sense, concentrating mainly on practical somaesthetics. In doing so, I place it among the philosophies written about by, for example, Pierre Hadot or the late Michel Foucault, who were instrumental in reviving the ancient idea of philosophy as the art of living in the second half of the 20th century. Shusterman, however, surpasses them in something important. It is not just in the way he introduces the concept of soma and embodiment into thinking about philosophy as an art of living. After all, the problem of the body and corporeality appears as a topic of philosophical interest in a fundamental way already in phenomenology, especially then in M. Merleau-Ponty. In Shusterman we see a fundamental shift in that he somatizes philosophy himself. As Kremer writes, “Shusterman takes the idea of philosophy as an art of living in a radically new direction when he performed as the Man in Gold” (Kremer, 2022, p. 59). I will not, however, get ahead of myself and return to this theme later.

First of all, it should be said that I am not mentioning Foucault here at random. He is, after all, mentioned in various contexts by the authors of the texts in the Abrams’ collection. Consider, for example, Leszek Koczanowicz’s text, ‘Somaesthetics, Somapower, and the Microphysics of Emancipation,’ in which he draws attention to the interconnection of power, the body, and politics. This is a topic that has been widely discussed throughout the 20th century, but Koczanowicz points out the deficits of the conceptions of well-known theorists of the body and corporeality, such as Foucault, Bourdieu, and Merleau-Ponty. These deficits can be summarized by what the author of the text wrote in relation to Foucault when he argued that

His theory is problematic in that it treats the body almost exclusively as a passive material to be transformed and subordinated into docility. Obviously, in his later work, Foucault introduced the concept of the ‘technologies of the self,’ which attributed far more agency to the body, but its conceivable power-opposing potency still remained very individualistic (Koczanowicz, 2022, p. 63).

I do not want to argue with the author’s argument here, let alone with its results, because I largely share it and appreciate his proposal to include in somaesthetics an investigation of the so-called “somapower” (Koczanowicz, 2022, pp. 71–72), which can substantially advance Foucault’s conception of the *biopouvoir*.² Such an exploration may be much needed in order for people to become more aware of the fact that the primary instrument of their liberation

¹ Shusterman, of course, distinguishes between analytic, pragmatic and practical somaesthetics (Shusterman, 2012, pp. 42–45), and what Kremer writes about belongs precisely to practical somaesthetics.

² I myself drew attention to the importance of the body in the context of resistance to power in my study *Estetika existencie v pragmatizme Richarda Shustermana* [The Aesthetics of Existence in Richard Shusterman’s Pragmatism] (cf. Švihura, 2023).

is constantly at their disposal. Or, better yet, that they themselves, as somatic beings, are a potential instrument of opposition to power. Despite all this, however, we must admit that Shusterman's own philosophical endeavours in practical somaesthetics are in some respects quite reminiscent of Foucault's concept of technologies of the self. And this also applies to the 'individualistic' nature of practical somaesthetics.

It should be added immediately, however, that the Hellenistic forms of care of the self (*epimeleia heautou*), of which the late Foucault wrote, were not unilaterally individualistic. Certainly, the self was central in these forms of care of the self, but on the other hand, this was also true of care of the self: "It does not mean simply being interested in oneself, nor does it mean having a certain tendency to self-attachment or self-fascination" (Foucault, 1983, p. 243). Indeed, it cannot be overlooked that these forms of care of the self or technologies of the self were often associated by Foucault with the phrase 'the art of living,' whereby the existence of the individual, through care of the self and the technology of the self, became 'work of art' not only for the individual himself as the product of his own activity, but also for those who came into contact with this existence. Such an art of living was even, in a sense, a socio-ethical and pedagogical practice in which the life of the individual could act as a model for others. That the care of the self in antiquity was not a purely individual activity was shown, for example, by Foucault in his analysis of Plato's dialogue *Alcibiades*: "The practice of the self is now integrated within, mixed up, and intertwined with a whole network of different social relations" (Foucault, 2005, p. 206). What we must be aware of, then, is that already in the original forms of the art of living, the preoccupation with the self, a kind of seemingly private aesthetics of existence, was woven into social relations and may have had many public benefits. In other words, that individuality and sociality, care of the self and care for others, were in some sense inseparable from the beginning. This digression to Foucault seems important to me because it can be used to bring us closer to how we should understand Shusterman's practical somaesthetics.

This can be further elucidated through a theme encountered in several of the essays in Abrams' book. This is the issue of the identity of the self. In his text 'Shusterman's Pragmatist Philosophy', among other things, Stefan Snævarr draws our attention to the fact that, whatever their differences, "Shusterman and Foucault share an aesthetic view of the body and the self, and a normative view of them, regarding each as intertwined and shaped by cultural and social forces" (Snævarr, 2022, p. 34). It is necessary to draw attention to this because Foucault assumes the postmodern fragmentation of our identity/self, as a result of which he begins to think about aesthetic self-creation, returning to analyses of the ancient art of living. "To be sure, the self is fragmented, but it can bounce back and refashion itself (without any aid of rules), as a modernist work of art" (Snævarr, 2022, p. 33). Foucault's words confirm this: "From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (Foucault, 1983, p. 237). Shusterman's practical somaesthetics is an great example of this.

The meaning of the statement ‘to create ourselves as a work of art’ takes concrete form in Shusterman’s experiment, which he undertook with the photographer Yann Toma, and which brought to life the strange creature known today as the Man in Gold. It is the result of artistic collaboration, which obviously participates in the expression of important aspects of Shusterman’s identity – that part of it which is not expressible in the context of the philosopher’s public identity and permanently remains hidden, except through artistic performance. In fact, it is not even discursively communicable, which is why art – in this case, ‘somaflux photography’ – seems to be the only appropriate tool to express it. That Man in Gold is an expression of Shusterman’s identity is suggested by several texts in Abrams’ book, such as Diane Richard-Allerdyce’s article ‘An Exquisitely Beautiful Longing: A Lacanian Reading of *The Adventures of the Man in Gold*,’ in which the author argues:

It is a costume that engenders transformation, as if the everyday costume of the narrator’s social self is exchanged for another in alignment with the creatively authentic yearnings of the narrator. The Man in Gold, a sensitive being whose motivating emotions are love and fear, does not speak; his having no language is significant of his character as a remembered part of the author’s being (rather than a projection or alter ego) and the book itself as, in part, a memoir, rather than or in addition to philosophical autobiography (Richard-Allerdyce, 2022, p. 151).

Through the author’s detailed Lacanian analysis, we come to a deeper understanding of Shusterman’s identity through the Man in Gold, as her text opens up deep levels of the private space of Shusterman’s somaesthetic experiences. For detached philosophical readers, this chapter may even be too personal, but it is nevertheless extremely beneficial in the context of understanding Shusterman’s philosophy, as it highlights its connection to the personal, even intimate, aspects of Shusterman’s life.

Overcoming the fragmentation of public and personal identity by making Shusterman’s art out of life suggests the individualistic and private nature of the motives of practical somaesthetics (in this particular case). The personal nature of Shusterman’s experiment is also highlighted in Yang Lu’s text ‘On Shusterman’s Somaesthetic Practice: the Case of the Man in Gold,’ which points out, among other things, the following: “Moreover, beyond its philosophical, literary, and aesthetic aims, the *Adventures* is a deeply personal effort at redemption through art, for the moral flaws and failures and regrets of the philosopher” (Lu, 2022, pp. 211–212), to which Shusterman himself admits. Equally personal, moreover, are Shusterman’s own words in the notes to each chapter of Abrams’ book, where he returns to the motif of detective mystery present in *Walk the Golden Night*. The latter is, among other things, the subject of Abrams’ last chapter in the second part of the book (‘Somaesthetics and Cinema: The Man in Gold in the Film *Walk the Golden Night*’), and Shusterman puts it in the context of the search for the true identity of ‘Wanmei’ – the supposed mother of the Man in Gold who appears at the end of the *Adventures*. Shusterman, however, asks who this character is to *the narrator of the story* (I consider my emphasis on the text important here) of Man in Gold – Shusterman himself.

Does this extend to the narrating author, who certainly loved his mother and perhaps never got over her death in 2005? Was he seeking her in another world through the Man in Gold? I do not know, and the Man in Gold cannot say. His wordless silence is an apt reminder to end here my words of response (Shusterman, 2022, p. 260).

Thus, Shusterman himself suggests that something of the performative art he realized in the 'possession' of the Man in Gold may also reveal something important about the narrator of the Man in Gold story – Shusterman himself.

But why do we focus on this personal level, present in some of the texts of Abrams' book? It is because this personal plan proves that Shusterman's *soma* embodies his own philosophy, from which he is inseparable precisely as a person. He thus belongs to those philosophers about whom he himself has long written, such as Confucius, who, in Shusterman's words, taught his disciples

by embodying his philosophy in his bodily behavior. Greek and Roman thinkers often likewise advocated this ideal, something by contrasting true philosophers who lived their philosophy to those who merely wrote philosophy and thus were denigrated as mere 'grammarians'. The idea of philosophy as an embodied art of living found renewed expression in American thinkers like Emerson and Thoreau who inspired both pragmatism and somaesthetics, underlining the distinction between mere 'professor of philosophy' and real philosophers who truly embody or live their thought (Shusterman, 2012, pp. 4–5).

Whether the distinction is ancient or American, between philosophers who write philosophy and those who embody it, what is important in each case is that the underlying Confucian motif is present in all of these cases, which is that embodied philosophy is never a purely individual and private enterprise, but that this embodiment is always involved in influencing others. Not only the immediate disciples of such a philosopher, but also the wider community (including the professional one) of which he or she is a part.

This connection of the individual and the social, or also private and public, I need to emphasize because it is an important part of Shusterman's pragmatism. And I think it is also an expression of his pragmatist meliorism. It is, however, a fundamentally different approach from that found in one of the most famous proponents of post-analytic pragmatism, Richard Rorty. Rorty is famous, among other things, for insisting very seriously on the distinction between an ethic of private self-creation and an ethic of public solidarity when he wrote about aesthetic self-creation (against which, as we know, Shusterman demarcates himself). Rorty's book *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* is perhaps the best known in this regard, where he reduces aesthetic self-creation to a purely private space in order to prevent our self-creation from potentially hurting others (cf. Rorty (1995)). While this concern of Rorty's has merit, it cannot be overlooked that aesthetic self-creation, on the other hand, can inspire others and even have an educative and cultivating effect. It is Shusterman's practical somaesthetics that clearly overcomes this dualism of private and public morality and demonstrates that even deeply personal interests need not be exclusive of public benefit.

This is pointed out, for example, in Yvonne Bezrucka's essay 'Shusterman as Philosopher and the Man in Gold,' which assesses Shusterman's *Adventures* as "an entirely new kind of philosophical experiment" (Bezrucka, 2022, p. 167). It is an experiment that is important, among other things, because this performance of a silent, different, and in a sense faceless, non-specific, even outright 'sexless' being, opens up new ethico-political levels of philosophical thought. This is shown, for example, when the author describes how random people reacted to the Man in Gold:

Nobody talks to the Man in Gold in a friendly manner, but each instead signals to him that barriers have been erected. In fact, some people even shout him away, and in doing so they reveal a pervasive frame of thought characterized by intolerance, prejudice, xenophobia, and cultural narrowmindedness with their correlated use of ethnic stereotypes (Bezrucka, 2022, p. 171).

Shusterman's philosophical-artistic experiment, while in a sense a way of coming to terms with his own life, also highlighted how the anxieties present in the percipients of the Man in Gold translated into an evaluation of what they were able to perceive thanks to Shusterman's experiment. And what they perceived was an embodiment of otherness that played an important role here. For, unlike the traditional medium of philosophy, which is the written text, at a given moment this experiment reveals an 'immoral' behaviour towards the stranger (the Man in Gold) who himself – both as a figure of art and as an *ex post* reflective philosopher – has the opportunity to experience and reflect on this behaviour not in detached philosophical abstraction but on the basis of personal experience. This cannot be seen other than as *par excellence* a consistent use of the Deweyan and empirical tradition in Shusterman's pragmatism and practical somaesthetics. This (and not only this) is what makes Shusterman's experimentation with photographic art original – for it fundamentally changes the mode of philosophical work, which in this case is not "just" working on oneself through artistic performance, but at the same time moves beyond personal experiences, which – if they can become discursive – can stimulate other people (I believe not only philosophers) to new thinking and new experiences (e.g., with morality, discrimination, and so on) as well.

And so Shusterman brings together in an original way what we academic philosophers have long been accustomed to compartmentalising. Philosophy and art, art and life, life and philosophy, which – as Shusterman teaches us by his own example – can form one harmonious whole. In this context, the numerous references to the philosophical tradition that Abrams mentions in his last essay are very revealing. In the context of my argument, however, this seems to me the most important to mention:

Socrates (whose mother was a midwife) is himself now kind of midwife: he is a philosophical midwife to young philosophers like Theaetetus who are 'pregnant' with thought, which can only be delivered by philosophical dialogue. As Socrates delivers thought by question and answer, the photographer Toma acts as midwife to deliver from the philosopher Richard Shusterman a new kind of art which is a synthesis of photography and philosophy (Abrams, 2022b, p. 221).

In Shusterman's experimentation, photographer Toma acts as midwife. He is the one who employs *maieutike techne* and acts as Socrates, suggesting that philosophy is born out of and with the help of art in the case of the *Adventures*.

If this is the case, I think that Abrams' interpretation can be supplemented by another important point, namely that the emphasis on birth through art is in some opposition to the Platonic philosophical tradition, which places art in some opposition to philosophy. In Shusterman's work it is exactly the opposite, and the one always conditions the other. Art and philosophy are here in inseparable contact, and so this metaphor is also a reminder of the non-Platonic or even anti-Platonic philosophy of pragmatism. This is also why practical somaesthetics is an original kind of philosophy of pragmatism. A philosophy that does not divide but unites, that does not exclude but includes, that seeks intersections and not differences. A philosophy that recognizes that it is in this joining that life is richer and fuller.

If we look back to antiquity, it was Socratic philosophy, living in dialogue and not primarily on paper and in books, that was this living philosophy – the private and public art of living, which was still long referred to as a source of inspiration by the Socratic schools, for whom philosophy was a comprehensive way of life. In this respect, Shusterman's practical somaesthetics is an original continuation of this tradition, and certainly in relation to it what Emil Višňovský wrote about pragmatism as such is true: "Pragmatism is a successor to Sophists, Socrates, Stoicism, and Epicureanism in terms of conceptions of philosophy – of what philosophy is good for and what philosophers should do: provide an understanding of the human condition that corresponds with its transformation" (Višňovský, 2014, p. 141). As Shusterman shows, the value of ancient philosophy can come alive today. Not, however, in endless repetitions, interpretations, and reinterpretations of dusty texts, but through our lives. With the help of both art and new technologies. With the help of interdisciplinary overlaps and openness to collaboration. With the courage to do philosophy differently. Doing it by living it.

Abrams has managed to compile a book that captures the immense complexity of Shusterman's philosophy, art, and life (while still making no claim to completeness). Although – as we have tried to show – philosophy, art and life form a single entity in the case of Shusterman, and their terminological distinction is really only verbal. In the case of academic philosophers, this is still quite unique, even though ancient philosophy often saw such a connection as something quite natural. Shusterman's philosophy is really a consequentialist pragmatism in this sense – experiential, lived, real. It just screams it from all the essays.

Although less than three hundred pages in length, the contents of the Abrams volume are extremely comprehensive and wide-ranging. This is due to the great choice of the authors of the texts, who are both true experts in Shusterman's philosophy and undisputed experts in their respective fields of knowledge, which is reflected in the quality of the individual chapters of the book. In this context, however, it is necessary to add that the book may not be

easy to read, especially if the reader does not have a sufficient range of knowledge in the areas of knowledge in which the authors of the individual chapters work expertly. However, the potential difficulty in navigating the topics treated is worth experiencing, because the reward is a substantial broadening of the horizons of thought (and perhaps even life).

The added value of Abrams' book is that the reader feels that Shusterman is somehow suddenly closer to him. Even though he knows him as a world-renowned figure in contemporary philosophy, he suddenly sees him as a human being – a philosopher and an artist (in the conjunction of all of the above words) whose life creates philosophy, and whose philosophy is created by his life. It is obvious why we academics often shy away from such symbiosis as we find in Shusterman, even though we love to write about the art of living. For it means giving up the comfort of the demarcation of text and life. For through it, our texts are always judged, and can be corrected theoretically and verbally after critique, but our lives can safely remain in seclusion and hidden from the critical public eye. Shusterman, with his practical somaesthetics, goes to market with his skin on, he is almost naked. And though he is clad in a golden costume, his inner self is laid bare. We have to admit, it takes tremendous courage.

As it seems, Shusterman's philosophy and his art truly lives, breathes, rebels and draws in other actors in the life of the *soma* bearing the name Richard. In doing so, Shusterman is not conceiving a private project of self-creation. On the contrary, he co-creates his surroundings ethically and pedagogically through his practice, as several texts have suggested. If Shusterman were to take Rorty's advice seriously and conceive a project of private self-creation, how might he inspire others?

References

- Abrams, J. J. (2022a) 'Introduction', in Abrams, J.J. (ed.) *Shusterman's Somaesthetics. From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Brill, pp. 1–19.
- Abrams, J. J. (2022b) 'Somaesthetics and Cinema: The Man in Gold in the Film Walk the Golden Night', in Abrams, J.J. (ed.) *Shusterman's Somaesthetics. From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Brill, pp. 219–240.
- Bezrucka, Y. (2022) 'Shusterman as Philosopher and the Man in Gold', in Abrams, J.J. (ed.) *Shusterman's Somaesthetics. From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Brill, pp. 166–176.
- Foucault, M. (1983) 'On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress', in Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinow, P. (eds) *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. The University of Chicago Press, pp. 229–252.
- Foucault, M. (2005) *The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at Collège de France, 1981–82*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Koczanowicz, L. (2022) 'Somaesthetics, Somapower, and the Microphysics of Emancipation', in Abrams, J.J. (ed.) *Shusterman's Somaesthetics. From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Brill, pp. 61–73.
- Kremer, A. (2022) 'From Pragmatism to Somaesthetics as Philosophy', in Abrams, J.J. (ed.) *Shusterman's Somaesthetics. From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Brill, pp. 44–60.
- Lu, Y. (2022) 'On Shusterman's Somaesthetic Practice: The Case of the Man in Gold', in Abrams, J.J. (ed.) *Shusterman's Somaesthetics. From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Brill, pp. 209–218.

- Richard-Allerdyce, D. (2022) 'An Exquisitely Beautiful Longing: A Lacanian Reading of The Adventures of the Man in Gold', in Abrams, J.J. (ed.) *Shusterman's Somaesthetics. From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Brill, pp. 149–165.
- Rorty, R. (1995) *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Cambridge University Press.
- Shusterman, R. (2012) *Thinking through the Body. Essays in Somaesthetics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Shusterman, R. (2022) 'Somaesthetics, Pragmatism, and the Man in Gold: Remarks on the Preceding Chapters', in Abrams, J.J. (ed.) *Shusterman's Somaesthetics. From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Brill, pp. 243–260.
- Snævarr, S. (2022) 'Shusterman's Pragmatist Philosophy', in Abrams, J.J. (ed.) *Shusterman's Somaesthetics. From Hip Hop Philosophy to Politics and Performance Art*. Brill, pp. 23–45.
- Švihura, L. A. (2023) 'Estetika existencie v pragmatizme Richarda Shustermana [The Aesthetics of Existence in Richard Shusterman's Pragmatism]', *Filozofia*, 78(6), pp. 444–461.
- Višňovský, E. (2014) 'Making the Pragmatist Art of Living Explicit.' In L. Koczanowicz – K. Liszka (Eds.) *Beauty, Responsibility, and Power. Ethical and Political Consequences of Pragmatist Aesthetics*. Brill, pp. 137–151.

Lukáš Arthur Švihura
University of Presov
Faculty of Arts, Institute of Philosophy
17. novembra 1
080 01 Prešov
Slovakia
lukas.svihura@unipo.sk

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.10513469